Political Islam in Afghanistan: At the Service of the Government and the Armed Opposition from 2014 till the Second Seizure of Power by the Taliban

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Political Islam has been one of the most important but attendant factors of the civil war in Afghanistan. The last phase of the existence of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (in 2014–2021, during Ashraf Ghani’s presidency), which ended with the second seizure of power in the country by the Taliban, was not an exception. Political Islam was instrumental for both parties to military conflict (the government and the armed opposition) in the context of the power struggle. Both parties underpinned by political Islam their own victory claims and assertions to keep or assume power respectively. Kabul primarily invoked to political Islam via national Ulama Council in support of its policy. The armed opposition used political Islam to prove Government’s illegitimacy and justify the necessity of fighting against the Republican regime. The results of this period of civil war in Afghanistan showed that insurgents’ Islamic rhetoric had turned out to be more effective in terms of propaganda and political mobilization. It was one of the reasons for the fall of the Republican Government in Afghanistan in 2021.

作者简介

N. Sazhenov

MGIMO University

Email: sazhenov.n.d@gmail.com
Moscow, Russia

参考

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